We show that business cycle variation reduces welfare through a decrease in the average level of employment and output in a labor market search model with learning on-the-job. The key mechanism is the following: It is well established that the Beveridge correlation is negative, i.e. that vacancies and unemployment are negatively correlated. Via the matching function business cycles therefore tend to reduce the average number of new jobs and, in turn, employment. Then, since learning on-the-job imply that aggregate human capital is increasing in employment, it follows that aggregate volatility reduces human capital. This, in turn, reduces the incentives to post vacancies, further reducing employment and human capital. We quantify this mechanism using a carefully calibrated model and …nd the output and welfare cost of business cycles to be large.
Introduction
A major question in macroeconomics is whether welfare costs of business cycles are substantial or not.
Since Lucas (1987) it has been well established that the cost of aggregate consumption ‡uctuations is negligible. Business cycles can induce welfare costs in other ways though, e.g. through their e¤ect on the cross-sectional distribution of consumption (Imrohoro¼ glu, 1989 , and many others). Furthermore, business cycles may a¤ect welfare through the average level of output, an issue that has been pushed recently by Summers (2015) who emphasizes the importance of stabilization policy to counteract this.
One recent example of a model with this type of mechanism is Hassan and Mertens (2017) , which show that expectational errors about future productivity increase risk-premia and reduce output. Our paper adds to this literature by presenting a new mechanism for how business cycles, or more generally aggregate volatility, reduce the level of output.
We show that business cycles substantially reduce the level of employment, output and welfare in a labor market search model with learning on-the-job. The key mechanism of the paper is the following:
It is well established that the Beveridge correlation is negative, i.e. that vacancies and unemployment are negatively correlated in the data (see e.g. Fujita and Ramey, 2012) . Via the matching function, this implies that business cycles tend to reduce the average number of new jobs and hence employment. 1 Then, since learning on-the-job implies that average human capital is increasing in employment, it follows that aggregate volatility reduces human capital. This, in turn, reduces the incentives to post vacancies, further reducing employment and so on in a vicious circle. This mechanism for how aggregate volatility reduces employment, human capital and thereby output is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 . The size of the cost of business cycles generated by this mechanism is accordingly largely determined by how sensitive the human capital distribution is to changes in employment, and how sensitive job creation is to changes in the human capital distribution.
We have here emphasized the correlation between vacancies and unemployment as driving the negative e¤ect of aggregate volatility on the average level of employment because this is the main 1 A negative Beveridge correlation implies that cov (v; u) < 0 with v denoting vacancies and u unemployment. Jung and Kuester (2011) states conditions for when aggregate volatility implies a reduction of employment in a simple search and matching model. Note that, using a …rst-order approximation,
where ! is the matching function elasticity. Then, using the employment ‡ow equation 1 ut = (1 ) (1 ut 1) + ft 1ut 1 with denoting the exogenous separation rate, we have, proceeding along the lines of Jung and Kuester (2011) , Eu u = 1 (1 !) (cov (v; u) var (u)) + (Ef f ) Eu + (Eu u) f | {z } Em m
:
As can be seen from this expression, unemployment under aggregate volatility is higher if the Beveridge correlation is negative and Ef f . factor in our model. 2 Regardless of the source, any reduction in average employment is ampli…ed by the positive relationship between the human capital distribution and employment induced by learning on-the-job. This extends beyond the costs of business cycles. For example, the e¤ect of a change in taxation that changes the average employment level will be ampli…ed by the human capital mechanism that we have outlined.
Another indication that business cycles reduce earnings, and hence output, comes from the literature on earnings losses from job displacement. Davis and von Wachter (2011, DvW henceforth) document empirically that both the frequency of job displacement and the present discounted earnings losses per displaced worker are increasing in the unemployment rate. 3 Together, these two facts imply that job displacement occurs at a higher frequency at times when it is more costly. An economy with the same average displacement rate but without any unemployment volatility would yield lower aggregate earnings losses due to displacement. These earnings losses due to job displacement constitute an overlooked potential component of the welfare costs of business cycles.
We model the above phenomenon in a general equilibrium framework with a search and matching 2 More generally, any convex cost (or concave bene…t or production function) in any cyclical variable tend to induce a negative relationship between aggregate volatility and employment. A prominent example is convex capital adjustment costs, which is commonly assumed in the business cycle literature.
3 Similar empirical results are obtained in Jacobson et al (1993) and Farber (2005 4 In addition to human capital dynamics, we choose to allow for an additional mechanism that drives earnings losses in the direction of the empirical evidence. This mechanism is a job ladder, stemming from idiosyncratic match productivity and on-the-job search.
Both unemployed and employed workers search for jobs, implying that worker wages then depend on job o¤ers from other …rms, i.e. outside options, giving rise to a wage ladder. This implies that a worker builds up "negotiation capital"when continuously employed and hence get an increasing share of the surplus. When loosing the job, the reemployment wage of the worker then decreases more than the fall in productivity.
The model is therefore quite rich in some dimensions. It accounts for heterogeneity on both the …rm and worker side. Firms di¤er in match quality which is subject to shocks. Workers di¤er in the level of general human capital which is determined by learning on-the-job, i.e. that workers gain human capital while employed, and lose human capital when unemployed. Direct evidence of such human capital dynamics is provided by Edin and Gustavsson (2008) . This type of dynamics has also been documented to be important for generating persistent earnings losses from job displacement (see Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela and Coles, 2015 , Huckfeldt, 2016 , Jarosch, 2015 . We calibrate our model by matching a large number of moments, including volatility of GDP and unemployment, standard worker ‡ow moments, the degree of wage dispersion, the cyclicality of job separations, and earnings losses per worker. We then compute the cost of business cycles by comparing the results for our full model to the results from the same model, but without aggregate volatility. 5 We …nd that business cycles reduce steady state employment, GDP and welfare by substantial amounts.
In particular, welfare (GDP) fall by 2.7-4.1 percent (4:1 percent) due to aggregate volatility. These are large e¤ects. Accounting for the transition dynamics the welfare gains of eliminating business cycles are slightly smaller, 1.5-2.6 percent. Human capital dynamics in the form of learning on-the-job are pivotal for the results -if we disable them in our model the implied GDP and welfare losses from business cycles are substantially reduced.
There is indicative empirical support for the relationship between aggregate volatility, unemployment and output implied by our model. Most closely related to our mechanism, there is a small literature regarding the relationship between volatility and the unemployment rate. Hairault et al. negative relationship between volatility of output and the growth rate of output. The seminal paper establishing this cross-country relationship is Ramey and Ramey (1995) . Luo et al. (2016) con…rm this result using more recent data.
The welfare e¤ects of the mechanism we are documenting works through the average level of output, or, to be exact, consumption. In this sense it is fundamentally di¤erent from most of the cost of business cycles literature, which analyses the e¤ects of business cycles on welfare through (aggregate or idiosyncratic) consumption volatility, including papers that, like ours, model idiosyncratic countercyclical labor income risk related to job displacement, but where this idiosyncratic risk is the costly part of business cycles (Krebs (2007) and Berger et al (2016) ). 6
Three papers have previously emphasized the e¤ect of business cycles on the average level of output in a search and matching labor market setting. Den Haan and Sedlacek (2014) quanti…ed the cost of business cycles in a setting where an agency problem generates ine¢ cient job separations in downturns thereby reducing employment and GDP. Our framework does not include any such agency problem.
In fact, the role of market imperfections for the cost of business cycles is negligible in our setting.
Jung and Kuester (2011) derived and quanti…ed the e¤ects on employment and welfare of the negative correlation between the job …nding rate and the unemployment rate. They did so in a simpler setting than ours, using a solution method of local second-order approximations, with wages assumed to be independent of tightness, and without endogenous separations. 7 Hairault et al (2010) also look at this issue in a setting without human capital dynamics. Both papers …nd that the business cycle e¤ect on GDP and welfare is well below one percent, i.e. on an order of magnitude smaller than ours.
In terms of modelling, if not research question, our paper is closely related to Lise and Robin (2017) , henceforth LR. As LR, we use global solution methods to solve the model. Our model also shares mechanisms with a number of papers that analyzes earnings losses from displacement (Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela and Coles, 2015 , Huckfeldt, 2016 , Jarosch, 2015 , Jung and Kuhn, 2016 , and Krolikowski, 2015 . All of these papers, except Huckfeldt (2016) , abstract from aggregate volatility.
6 It is also distinct from the mechanism in Krebs (2003) . There countercyclical idiosyncratic income risk imply that business cycles reduce human capital investment, and for low values of risk aversion, total (physical + human) investment. 7 In an extension they allowed for learning on-the-job, but assumed a weaker dependence of human capital on employment than we do.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 documents the calibration and Section 4 provides the quantitative results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Model
The basic building blocks of our model are similar to LR. 8 In terms of human capital dynamics the model is in the tradition of Pissarides (1992) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) . As in these papers, we model general human capital as stemming from learning on-the-job. We include heterogeneity both on the worker and the …rm side. Worker human capital is indexed by x and the match-speci…c productivity is indexed by y. Both x and y follow stochastic processes. Let the Markov transition probability y (y; y 0 ) denote the dynamics of the match-speci…c productivity and let xe (x; x 0 ) ( xu (x; x 0 )) denote the Markov transition probability for the worker's human capital level while employed (unemployed).
Human capital of employed workers is weakly increasing while for unemployed workers it is weakly decreasing, re ‡ecting an assumption of learning on-the-job. 9 Each …rm employs (at most) one worker and output from a match is p (x; y; z) = xyz where z denotes aggregate TFP and (z; z 0 ) denotes the Markov transition probability of z. There is no physical capital. Workers search for jobs both when employed and unemployed. Utility is linear in consumption and the discount factor is . Wages are determined by Bertrand competition between …rms so that a worker always receive a value equal to his outside option. This determination of wages follows Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and LR and is generally referred to as "sequential auctions".
Finally, in order to capture human capital dynamics, workers die with probability .
Let us here mention two computational aspects of the model which is solved using global solution methods. First, wage determination through sequential auctions jointly with risk neutrality and a common discount factor implies that the expected value of a match for an employer (and hence the value of posting a vacancy) is independent of the future cross-sectional distributions of workers and …rms. This was pointed out by LR and simpli…es computations signi…cantly. In particular, equilibrium allocations can be solved for without computing the expected next period distribution of workers across 8 Compared to LR the features we add are i) Accumulation of human capital, x, on-the-job as well as decumulation during unemployment, and ii) idiosyncratic shocks to the match-speci…c productivity y: These assumptions are made to generate empirically relevant persistence of earnings losses and separations, respectively. Another di¤erence from LR is that in our model the productivity y of a match is not known when a vacancy is posted. This last di¤erence substantially simpli…es the computation of individual wages. LR did not compute wages.
9 Our human capital dynamics di¤er from Sargent (1998, 2008) and Jung and Kuester's (2011) extension with human capital. They did not model heterogeneity in match-speci…c productivity and presumably therefore assumed, as a short-cut, that part of the human capital loss occur when a worker is separated from a job and the remaining part occurs gradually during unemployment. With only exogenous separations this reduces the dependence of the human capital distribution on employment (or any endogenous variable in the model).
…rms and within the pool of unemployed. Second, computing individual wages and value functions for workers are still non-trivial tasks, because current wages depend on the probability of receiving a job o¤er the next period. This, in turn, depends on the next period's labor market tightness. A key determinant for next period's tightness is the expected value to a …rm of matching with a worker in the next period, which in turn depends on the next period distribution of workers and …rms. Fortunately, the equilibrium conditions of our model indicate three moments that fully capture the implications of this large dimensional object. We then use a Krusell and Smith (1998) style algorithm to let these three moments summarize and predict the labor market tightness, thereby enabling us to solve for the wages. For details on the solution algorithm see Appendix A.2.
Preliminaries
Let us start the detailed model description by providing an overview of the timing protocol. The sequence of events within a period are the following: First, the aggregate productivity shock z and the idiosyncratic shocks (x; y) are realized. Second, the fraction of workers that die is replaced by newborn unemployed workers with human capital at the lowest possible level, x. Third, separations into unemployment occur. Then …rms post vacancies and workers search. Finally, new matches are formed, wages are set and production takes place.
Let 1 fg denote the indicator function and let S (x; y; z) denote the total surplus of a match.
Matches with negative total surplus S (x; y; z) are endogenously dissolved. In addition, a fraction of matches are exogenously destroyed every period.
Separations and values
The stock of unemployed after endogenous and exogenous separations into unemployment is:
The stock of matches of type (x; y) at this point is:
A worker that is unemployed during the production phase receives a ‡ow payo¤ of b (x; z) repre-senting utility of leisure and value of home production. Due to the negotiation setup where the …rm reaps the entire surplus above the worker's outside option, the value of unemployment, B (x; z) ; is independent of the job …nding probability, and any other endogenous variable or distribution:
where X is the set of human capital states and Z is the set of a aggregate productivity states. 10 As shown by LR (their proposition 1 and the proof thereof), the total surplus of a match does not depend on any of the (future) endogenous distributions. It is instead simply:
where Y is the set of match-speci…c productivity states.
A measure one of new …rms is created every period and their match-speci…c productivities are drawn from the probability density function (pdf) f (y), which is identical across …rms. Also, an unemployed worker exerts search e¤ort s 0 and an employed worker exerts search e¤ort s 1 . Recalling that workers receive a value corresponding to their outside option, with the …rm capturing the remaining part of the surplus, the expected value of a new match for a …rm is:
where (h + ; u + ) and L is the aggregate amount of search e¤ort:
The …rst term in (5) refers to expected surplus from recruiting out of the pool of unemployed and the second term refers to expected surplus from recruiting from existing matches.
Vacancy determination
After separations into unemployment, …rms post vacancies and workers search. If a …rm posts v vacancies it incurs a convex cost c (v). The match-speci…c productivity is observed when the …rm meets a worker, after the vacancy posting decision. The optimality condition for vacancy creation therefore implies:
The vacancy cost function has the following functional form:
Thus, our model allows for convex vacancy posting costs which may a¤ect the relationship between aggregate volatility and employment. As is shown in Table ? ?, the e¤ect of eliminating this convexity on employment is small.
Since all …rms face the same probability distribution over productivities, aggregation in terms of vacancy posting across …rms is trivially symmetric, i.e., V = v:
We assume the following Cobb-Douglas meeting function:
Note that the probability of …lling a vacancy (assuming an interior solution) is:
where V L is labor market tightness. Together with the matching function (7) and an assumption of an interior solution this implies that equilibrium vacancy postings are determined by:
By using (8), the de…nition of , and the de…nition of J in (5), labor market tightness is a function of z and and can be written as:
Distributional dynamics
For a new match to be formed two conditions are required: the two parties must meet according to the meeting function (7) and the match must be an improvement over status quo (the current match or unemployment). The unemployment distribution u (x; z) resulting from vacancy postings and search accordingly is:
The corresponding expression for the employment distribution h (x; y; z) is:
mass lost to more productive matches
mass poached from less productive matches (11) whereỹ denotes the competing match when an employed worker is matched to a new job due to on-the-job search.
Wage determination
Let W (w; x; y; z; ) denote the present value to a worker with human capital x, in a match with productivity y with wage w and aggregate productivity z, with summarizing the endogenous aggregate state. These worker values are determined according to the sequential auction bargaining protocol in LR, and detailed as follows. Denote the renegotiated wage by w 0 . Workers hired out of unemployment receive their reservation wage w 0 such that W w 0 ; x; y; z; = B (x; z) :
For employed workers that have received a poaching o¤er, Bertrand competition between employers imply that these workers have a present value W (w; x; y; z; ) equal to the total surplus of the second best match that they have encountered during a spell of continuous employment. Formally, if a worker of type x, employed at a …rm of type y meets a …rm of typeỹ then, if S (x; y; z) < S (x;ỹ; z) the worker switches to the new …rm and gets the wage w 0 satisfying W w 0 ; x;ỹ; z; = S (x; y; z) + B (x; z) :
If instead S (x; y; z) S (x;ỹ; z) the worker remains in his current match and gets a wage w 0 commensurate with the maximum of the value of the outside match (x;ỹ) and the value at the current wage:
W w 0 ; x; y; z; = max fS (x;ỹ; z) + B (x; z) ; W (w; x; y; z; )g ;
Wages for workers that do not receive poaching o¤ers can also be rebargained, as aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks might a¤ect whether the current wage is in the bargaining set, i.e.,
B (x; z) 6 W (w; x; y; z; ) 6 S (x; y; z) + B (x; z) :
Along the lines of Hall (2005) , the wage w is thus …xed within a match as long as it is in the bargaining set (14). In case the wage is too low or too high, violating (14), it is adjusted to generate a worker value at the closest boundary of the bargaining set.
Given the above protocol for how the worker value W is set, we are now ready to state an expression for the worker value function as a function of the current wage w. This expression includes the probability of an employed worker meeting a …rm. Imposing an interior solution for M , M = L ! V 1 ! and using the de…nition of q, the probability of meeting a new …rm is s 1 (z 0 ; 0 ) 1 ! . Then, given the wage w, the worker value is:
W (w; x; y; z; ) = w + 1 1 + r 
Wage distribution
When determining the wage distribution, the current wage of the worker is a state variable. It summarizes the entire wage-relevant history of the worker. Conditional on aggregate technology evolving from z 1 to z; the distribution of matches over w, x and y evolves according to:
(1 ) (1 ) 1 fS (x; y; z) 0g xe (x 1 ; x) y (y 1 ; y) h w (w; x 1 ; y 1 ; z 1 ) :
due to separations and idiosyncratic shocks. Analogously to (11) in section 2.4, we de…ne h w (w; x; y; z)
which accounts for new matches; see Appendix A.1.
Calibration
Flow payo¤ from unemployment is b (x; z) = b 0 + b 1 x; i.e. independent of the aggregate level of technology z. We let b depend on the human capital (i.e. productivity) of the worker, x, as a proxy for the value of home production or alternatively as a proxy for unemployment bene…ts that is a function of the previous earnings.
The log of the exogenous part of TFP, z; follows an AR(1) process approximated by a Markov chain. The log of the initial match productivity f (y) is normally distributed. The log of the matchproductivity y within a match follows an AR(1) process without drift that is approximated by a Markov chain. The mean value of this AR(1) process coincides with the mean value of the initial match productivity distribution, f (y) and is normalized to 0.5.
The number of gridpoints for x; y and z are 10, 8 and 5 respectively. 11 The wage grid contains 15 points and is chosen separately for each parameter vector so as to only cover the relevant wage interval. 12 In constructing the grid for human capital, x, we, as Jarosch (2015) and Jung and Kuester (2011) , follow Sargent (1998, 2008) in using an equal-spaced grid and in setting the ratio between the maximum and minimum value of x to 2. The structure of the transition matrices xe (x; x 0 ) and xu (x; x 0 ) for human capital also closely follow Ljungqvist and Sargent. Abstracting from the bounds, the probability of an employed worker to increase his human capital by one gridpoint is x up and the probability for an unemployed worker to decrease his human capital by one gridpoint is x dn . With the reciprocal probabilities the human capital of a worker is unchanged.
Calibration approach
The frequency of the model is monthly. We calibrate the model based on U.S. data in the following way: Parameters whose values are well established in the literature or from solid empirical evidence are set outside the model. The matching function elasticity ! is set in line with the convention in the literature. The exogenous match separation rate is equal to the ratio of non-layo¤s in JOLTS 2001-2011 (0.598) multiplied by the mean E2U transition rate reported by Fujita and Ramey (2009) , adjusted for workers …nding a new job the same month as they lost the old job. 13 We set the retirement (or death) rate to match an average work life of 40 years, as e.g. Huckfeldt (2016) . To compute the persistence of the AR process for TFP, we follow along the lines of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) . Speci…cally, we simulate a monthly Markov chain to match a quarterly autocorrelation of (HP-…ltered) log labor productivity of 0:765. Finally, we set r to yield an annualized interest rate of 5% as in LR.
The remaining parameters of our model do not have well established values and will instead be calibrated jointly to match key moments. Note …rst that, since we are interested in the cost of business cycles, it is important to match GDP and unemployment volatility. We calibrate the 10 parameters in Table 3 by matching the 10 moments in Table 2 by minimizing the squared percentage deviation between model and data moments. The model parameters are jointly estimated, but some moments are more informative about certain parameters. The transition rates from unemployment to employ-ment tend to be informative about matching function productivity and the vacancy cost parameter c 0 . The job to job transition rate is informative about the relative search intensity of employed s 1 =s 0 , the volatility of GDP and unemployment about the standard deviation of the aggregate productivity process. Moreover, the correlation between separations and labor productivity and earnings loss cyclicality are informative about the match-speci…c shock process parameters. 14 Wage dispersion and the earnings loss level (and cyclicality) are informative about the human capital gain/loss when employed/unemployed, x up and x dn . 15 Wage dispersion and unemployment volatility are informative about the unemployment payo¤ parameters. Finally, GDP persistence is informative about parameters generating endogenous persistence in the model. These include any parameters directly a¤ecting labor market ‡ows as well as the human capital dynamics. for computing correlations and standard deviations (E2U transition rate, labor productivity and unemployment) are quarterly means of monthly series. These and GDP and have been logged and HP-…ltered with = 1600, both in the data and the model. Earnings loss is measured on an annual frequency.
The relevant measure of wage dispersion for our model is "residual"wage dispersion, i.e. controlling for heterogeneity not present in the model such as age, education, etc. We take the mean-min ratio (capturing the minimum by the 10th wage percentile) from Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) as 1 4 We keep the variance of the initial match-speci…c productivity, f (y), equal to the ergodic variance of the AR(1) process for the within-match productivity dynamics.
1 5 As in Jarosch (2015), we impose a relationship between xup and x dn such that the number of increases in human capital roughly equals the number of decreases to minimize bunching at end-points of the human capital grid X. In particular, let u e (x) (and h e (x; y)) denote the ergodic distribution of unemployed (employed) workers across x, given that aggregate productivity is constant (and set to one) for all t. Then, letting u tot = P x u e (x), we impose
x for the equilibrium values of employment and unemployment, implying x dn = xup 1 [Ex(
(1 u tot ) x 1 u tot u tot . There will still be some upward drift, and thereby upper end-point bunching, in the human capital distribution if an above proportional fraction of the unemployed are at the lower bound of the human capital grid, unless this is o¤set by the analogous force of above proportional fraction of employed workers at the upper bound. our measure of wage dispersion. We use their preferred measure of 1.50 which is an average of census, OES and PSID data.
We use the same de…nition of earnings loss from job displacement as the empirical literature. We target the average level of earnings loss as a fraction of pre-displacement earnings in the second full calendar year (which ends 25-35 months after displacement) reported by DvW. The second year is chosen as a trade-o¤ between two factors: First, the aim of this moment is to capture human capital loss during unemployment, and human capital loss is the main factor driving earnings loss from job displacement at long horizons. This speaks in favor of targeting earnings loss moments at long horizons, even longer than 2-3 years. Second, computational considerations favors shorter horizons. 16 This also favors using earnings losses instead of wage increases during employment to pin down human capital dynamics, since most of the human capital loss is materialized relatively quickly, due to fairly short unemployment durations. We also target the cyclical component of earnings loss, measured as the percentage increase in earnings loss in recessions compared to expansions, again measured for the second full calendar year after displacement.
Earnings loss computations
To compute earnings loss cyclicality, we …rst need to de…ne what constitutes an expansion and a recession. In the model we de…ne a time period, i.e. a month, as an expansion (recession) if GDP is above (below) the 12th percentile in the simulated output of our model. The choice of the 12th percentile as the cuto¤ between expansion and recession follows Huckfeldt (2016) and is made to enable comparison with DvW. They use NBER dated recessions and these make up 12% of their sample period.
The observation frequency of earnings in the empirical literature is annual. We accordingly compute earnings losses of workers displaced in a particular calender year. When computing earnings losses we follow DvW by weighting each expansion (or recession) year by the number of months of that year that the economy was in an expansion (recession). For workers displaced in a given expansion (recession) month, we then compute average earnings for displaced (de…ned as separated, either endogenously or exogenously) and non-displaced workers, respectively, for each period over the earnings loss horizon. We let the "control group" of non-displaced workers be identical to the displaced workers in terms of all individual state variables, w; x; y, in the month prior to displacement. In this way we minimize the selection e¤ects in generating earnings losses. 17;18 4 Results
Targeted moments and the parameter estimates
The moment-matching exercise can be evaluated by comparing the last two columns in Table 2 . The model is able to …t most of these moments well. The two exceptions are the level of earnings loss and the U2E transition rates, with deviations of roughly 25%.
The above moment matching exercise determines the 10 parameters in Table 3 . It might appear surprising that we need to calibrate the volatility of (the exogenous part of) TFP, but this is necessary as the model has internal ampli…cation of the exogenous TFP shocks, as both the productivity of matches, the level of human capital and sorting between workers and jobs varies over the cycle. All of this implies that TFP in our model is a combination of exogenous TFP and endogenous propagation. Let us here interpret and comment on some of the parameter values in Table 3 obtained through the moment matching exercise. The value for s 1 =s 0 indicates that employed workers meet prospective employers roughly one-third as often as unemployed workers. The value of c 1 of one quarter indicates that vacancy posting costs are close to linear, only slightly convex. We follow LR and report the replacement ratio for unemployed workers as a fraction of the output of the best possible match. b 0 and b 1 jointly imply that this ratio is 0:90, averaged over the human capital values. The estimate of the volatility of the exogenous part of TFP (to be exact, labor productivity) imply that roughly half 1 7 Note that, given that we know how to compute transitions using the equations for u+(x 1; z 1), u(x; z), h w + (w; x 1; y 1; z 1) and h w (w; x; y; z), we can feed in an arbitrary initial worker distribution and follow the distribution of these workers over time. Then, we can use the resulting distributions to compute earnings in the two groups.
1 8 As in the empirical literature, e.g. DvW, we require that non-displaced workers stay with the same employer for the …rst 3 years after the displacement date. This requirement slightly modi…es the expressions for h w + (w; x 1; y 1; z 1) and h w (w; x; y; z) : of the total variation in observed labor productivity is exogenous. The other half is due to cyclical variation in endogenous variables. That the level of cyclical ampli…cation implied by the two-sided heterogeneity in the labor market is this strong, is an interesting result in it own right.
Given their centrality for our mechanism, we report and comment in more detail on our estimates of the learning on-the-job parameters. The estimated Markov transition probabilities (x up = 0:068 and x dn = 0:76) imply that the expected monthly human capital increase for an employed worker is 0:35 percent, while the expected decrease when unemployed is 2:54 percent. 19 We know of only one direct measure in the literature of general human capital loss while nonemployed: Edin and Gustavsson (2008) . They use a Swedish panel of individual level data that includes test results on labor market relevant general skills and information about employment status between test dates. First, they …nd that time-out-of-work (compared to employment) implies skill loss, signi…cant at the 1% level. Second, this skill loss appears to be linear in time out-of-work. Third, the speed of skill loss is substantial: being out-of-work for a year implies losing skills equivalent to 0.7 years of schooling. 20 The human capital dynamics can be compared to estimates in models broadly similar to ours.
Huckfeldt (2016) To sum up this comparison to the literature, our human capital dynamics are roughly in line with the estimates of Huckfeldt (2016) , but the speed of learning and "unlearning"is substantially above what Jarosch (2015) …nds using German data.
Welfare measure
Our main exercise is to look at the welfare consequences of eliminating aggregate volatility, implying that we take the transition dynamics into account. As is standard in the literature, we report the amount of consumption agents are willing to forego to eliminate business cycles. The linearity of utility in consumption makes welfare calculations straight forward in our model, as per period aggregate welfare is equal to aggregate consumption (i.e. GDP net of vacancy posting costs). Note that one may interpret the unemployment payo¤, b, in two ways which have di¤erent welfare implications. In the …rst interpretation, b is home production (or equivalently, from a welfare perspective, utility of leisure) in which case the welfare relevant quantity is the sum of market consumption and the unemployment payo¤. In the second interpretation b is a pecuniary transfer not directly a¤ecting aggregate utility.
We report results for both interpretations. 22 To further facilitate the interpretation of the results, we also report the results for a comparison between the stochastic average and the non-stochastic steady state.
Results for costs of business cycles
As outlined above we compute the welfare e¤ects of eliminating aggregate volatility from the economy.
As summarized in Table 4 we …nd that in our model the elimination of aggregate shocks, taking the transition into account, increases welfare by 2:57% or 1:52%, depending on the interpretation of unemployment bene…ts. We can gain some intution into the mechanism by instead comparing the steady state quantities in an economy with and without aggregate volatility. As summarized in Table 5 we …nd that in our model the elimination of aggregate volatility increase employment, GDP and consumption by substantial amounts. In particular, consumption, and thereby (steady state) welfare, increase by 2.7-4.1 percent, depending on the interpretation of unemployment bene…ts. We note that the key force generating cost of business cycles is the human capital dynamics. The mean level of human capital of employed workers, E (x h ( )), increase by 2:2 percent when aggregate volatility is eliminated. The corresponding number for unemployed workers; E (x u ( )), is 4:5 percent. 23 Both of these changes are due to the increase in employment and the corresponding decrease in unemployment. Note that there are other factors a¤ecting GDP than just the mean values of employment and human capital.
Examples include the change in the mean level of match-speci…c productivity, E (y h ( )), (which decreases by 0:16 percent) and the changed degree of sorting between workers and …rms (as well as the covariation between any of these objects with the cycle). 
Conclusions
A central question in macroeconomics is how large the welfare costs of business cycles are. We show that cyclical variation reduces aggregate welfare in a labor market search model with general human capital dynamics, as it drives down the level of employment, output and consumption. The key mechanism of the paper is the following: Empirically, the Beveridge correlation is negative, i.e.
vacancies and unemployment are negatively correlated. This, in turn, means that business cycles tend to reduce the average number of matches and hence employment, through the employment- ‡ow equation. Then, since learning on-the-job imply that human capital is increasing in the employment rate, it follows that aggregate volatility reduces human capital. This, in turn, reduces incentives to post vacancies, further reducing employment. We …nd that the steady state output and welfare losses due to business cycles are large -they amount to 4:1 percent and 2.7-4.1 percent respectively, and this result is not very sensitive to the exact calibration. Accounting for the transition dynamics the welfare gains of eliminating business cycles are slightly smaller, 1.5-2.6 percent.
To conclude, let us brie ‡y discuss some broader implications of our results. In our model there is only one type of aggregate shock. If we view this shock as a "catch-all" for any variation in …rm revenues including e¤ects of …scal and monetary policy we can draw interesting policy conclusions. In particular, a policy that successfully stabilizes unemployment (or job …nding rates) raises the average level of output. For this reason, our paper rationalizes an unemployment stabilization mandate for central banks as well as a …scal policy that stabilizes unemployment. In this sense we reach the same conclusion as Berger et al. (2016) and Galí (2016) iii) Set the parameter
with u e (x) denoting the ergodic distribution of unemployed workers across x, given that aggregate productivity is set to one for all t.
iv) Use value function iteration to solve for B(x; z) in (3). v) Compute the ergodic distributions for u (x) and h (x; y) for a …xed z = z (see below for details).
vi) If unemployment is too di¤erent from previous value, go back to iii).
Step 2. Use value function iteration to solve B(x; z) in (3).
Step 3. Solve for fJ t ; h t+1 ; u t+1 ; V t ; L t ; M t ; t g T t=0 recursively for each time period. Given the solution for S(x; y; z), the initial conditions u 0 and h 0 , and a sequence for fz t g t=0:::T , iterate forward to create a time series for u t , h t and any aggregates of these we are interested in: i) calculate u t+ (x) and h t+ (x; y) using (1) and (2) ii) calculate L t by aggregating over u t+ (x) and h t+ (x; y)
iii) calculate J t using (5). iv) calculate t using (9) v) calculate V t using (8) vi) calculate u t+1 (x) and h t+1 (x; y) using (10) and employment transition (11) To obtain the ergodic distributions for u t+1 (x) and h t+1 (x; y) simulate above for a …xed z until convergence in these distributions.
Given the sequence based on fz t g t=0:::T above, we use the resulting sequence of (after removing an initial burn-in period) to compute wages and then the sequence of h w t+1 to compute relevant moments of the wage distribution along the sequence where we have followed the algorithm described in section A.2.1 to compute worker values W (w; x; y; z; ) and wages w (w; x; y; z; ).
A.2.1 Algorithm for determination of W and w As can be seen from (15) the worker value function depends on 0 , i.e. the entire expected next period distribution of matches across x and y and unemployed workers distribution over x: The challenge is to reduce the dimensionality of the distributions 0 to something manageable. The key to our algorithm is to note that all in ‡uence of the endogenous distributions goes through the next period labor market tightness, 0 . In addition, according to (9) labor market tightness is a function only of L in (6) and J in (5). Hence, we can write as a function of the moments that make up (6) and (5);
= (m 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 ; z). In particular, based on (6) and up to a scalar transformation,
as we note that P x P y h + (x; y; z) = 1 P x u + (x; z) and accordingly L t s 0 P x u + (x; z) + s 1 (1 P x u + (x; z)) : Given L t from m 1 ; equation (5) We loosely follow Krusell and Smith (1998 In the end, we can replace the distributions in 0 by (m 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 ) so that instead of (w; x; y; z; ) the …nal state vector is (w; x; y; z; m 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 ). With the functions and H m at hand, we solve for worker values W . This is done with value function iteration. m i ; fi = 1; 2; 3g is therefore discretized on a grid with 2 gridpoints. We choose fewer gridpoints for m i than for z as m i is quantitatively less important.
Finally, once we know the worker values W we can solve for wages w residually. This amounts to rewriting equation (15) to …nd the wage that yields the right value of W for the current state vector (w; x; y; z; m 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 ) given the expected future values for the worker.
